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Abstract. This paper presents two new improved attacks on the KMOV
cryptosystem. KMOV is an encryption algorithm based on elliptic curves
over the ring ZN where N = pq is a product of two large primes of equal
bit size. The first attack uses the properties of the convergents of the
continued fraction expansion of a specific value derived from the KMOV
public key. The second attack is based on Coppersmith’s method for
finding small solutions of a multivariate polynomial modular equation.
Both attacks improve the existing attacks on the KMOV cryptosystem.
1 Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem [21], invented in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman,
is the most widely used cryptosystem. The main parameters in RSA are two
integers, the RSA modulus N = pq where p and q are large prime numbers, and
the public exponent e, which is an integer satisfying gcd(e, (p − 1)(q − 1)) = 1.
The private exponent is the integer d satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod (p− 1)(q − 1)). In
many implementations, the private exponent d is required to be small to ease
decryption and signature. Unfortunately, this scenario is dangerous and can be
used to break the system [3,6]. In 1990, Wiener [25,24] presented an attack to
break the RSA system if the private exponent d satisfies d < 14√18N
1
4 . Since
then, Wiener’s bound has been extended in many situations, mainly by Boneh
and Durfee [2] to d < N0.292.
In 1985, Miller [17] and Koblitz [13] independently proposed to use elliptic
curves in cryptography. Since then, many cryptosystems have been proposed
based on elliptic curves. In the direction of RSA, Koyama, Maurer, Okamoto
and Vanstone [14] proposed a cryptosystem, called KMOV, based on the elliptic
curve EN (0, b) where N = pq is an RSA modulus and EN (0, b) is the set of
solutions of the modular equation y2 ≡ x3 + b (mod N), together with the point
at infinity, denoted O. When the prime factors p and q are such that p ≡ q ≡ 2
(mod 3), then any point P ∈ EN (0, b) satisfies (p+ 1)(q + 1)P = O. In KMOV,
the public key is a pair (N, e) where N = pq with two prime integers satisfying
p ≡ q ≡ 2 (mod 3) and e is an integer satisfying gcd(e, (p+ 1)(q + 1)) = 1. The
decryption exponent is the integer d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod (p+ 1)(q + 1)).
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Notice that the modular equation ed ≡ 1 (mod (p+1)(q+1)) is equivalent to
the integer key equation ed−k(p+1)(q+1) = 1. In 1995, Pinch [20] used the key
equation and extended Wiener’s attack to KMOV. He showed that one can factor
the modulus N = pq if d < 13N
1
4 . In [11], Ibrahimpasic extended the attack of
Pinch by a few bits using an exhaustive search. Both attacks use the convergents
of the continued fraction expansion of eN . In [18], Nitaj considered the generalized
equation eu− (p+ 1)(q + 1)v = w and showed that one can factor the modulus
N = pq if the parameters u, v, w satisfy some specific conditions, especially if
uv <
√
2
√
N
12 . The method combines the continued fraction algorithm [4,7] and
Coppersmith’s method [8] for solving univariate modular equations.
In this paper, we extend the former attacks on KMOV. In the first attack
we consider the KMOV key equation ed − k(p + 1)(q + 1) = 1 and instead of
using the convergents of eN , we use the convergents of
e
N+1+
(
1+ 3
√
2
4
)
N
1
2
. As a
consequence, we show that one can factor the modulus N = pq if the private
exponent d is such that d < 2
√
2N
3
4√
e
. This bound improves the former bound
d < 13N
1
4 , especially when the public exponent e is significantly smaller then N .
In the second attack we consider the generalized key equation eu−(p+1)(q+
1)v = w and transform it to the modular polynomial equation v(p+q+1)+Nv+
w ≡ 0 (mod e). We consider the polynomial f(x, y, z) = xy+Nx+ z and apply
Coppersmith’s method to find the small solutions of the modular polynomial
equation f(x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod e). When e = Nβ , u < Nδ and |w| < Nγ , if
δ <
7
6
− γ − 1
3
√
6β − 6γ + 1− ε,
where ε is a small constant, then Coppersmith’s method enables us to find p+
q+ 1, which combined with N = pq gives p and q. We note that in the standard
situation of a KMOV instance with e ≈ N and eu− (p+ 1)(q+ 1)v = 1, our new
bound is δ < 0.284 which is much larger than the existing bounds.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some
preliminaries on Coppersmith’s method, continued fractions, elliptic curves and
recall the KMOV cryptosystem. In Section 3, we present our first attack on
KMOV based on continued fractions. In Section 4, we present our second attack
on KMOV which is based on Coppersmith’s method. We conclude the paper in
Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we give some preliminaries on Coppersmith’s methods for solving
modular polynomial equations, continued fractions and elliptic elliptic curves.
For completeness, we recall the KMOV cryptosystem.
Improved Cryptanalysis of the KMOV Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 3
2.1 Coppersmith’s method
One of the difficult problems in algebra is to solve modular polynomial equations
of the form
f(x1, . . . , xn) ≡ 0 (mod e),
where f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Z[x1, . . . , xn] is multivariate polynomial. In 1996, Cop-
persmith [8] introduced a rigorous method for finding the small solutions of the
univariate polynomial equation f(x) ≡ 0 (mod e) and the small roots of the
bivariate polynomial equation f(x, y) = 0. Coppersmith’s method is based on
lattice reduction and is useful in cryptography, especially for attacking the RSA
cryptosystem (see [16,5,1,19]). Since then, numerous variants of Coppersmith’s
method have been presented for multivariate polynomial equations assuming
certain hypothesis. The following result of Howgrave-Graham [10] is useful for
solving the polynomial equations.
Theorem 1 (Howgrave-Graham). Let e be a positive integer and h(x, y, z) ∈
Z[x, y, z] be a polynomial with at most ω monomials. Let m be a positive integer.
Suppose that
h (x0, y0, z0) ≡ 0 (mod em) and
‖h(xX, yY, zZ)‖ =
√∑
i,j,k
ai,j,kxiyjzk <
em√
ω
,
where |x0| < X, |y0| < Y , |z0| < Z. Then h (x0, y0, z0) = 0 holds over the
integers.
For a multivariate polynomial modular equation f(x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod e), the
idea in Coppersmith’s method is to build certain modular polynomials equa-
tions h(x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod em) sharing the modular solution (x0, y0, z0). These
polynomials are generally built by applying Jochemz-May [12] method and ap-
plying lattice reduction techniques such as the LLL algorithm [15]. The LLL
algorithm acts on lattices and the following result is useful (see [15,16,12]).
Theorem 2 (LLL). Let L be a lattice spanned by a basis (u1, . . . , uω), then the
LLL algorithm produces a new basis (b1, . . . , bω) satisfying
‖b1‖ ≤ . . . ≤ ‖bi‖ ≤ 2
ω(ω−1)
4(ω+1−i) det(L) 1ω+1−i , i = 1, . . . , ω.
To find the root (x0, y0, z0), we use a system with three polynomial equations
hi(x, y, z) = 0, i = 1, 2, 3. By using Gro¨bner basis computation or resultant tech-
niques, the system can be solved under the following widely believed assumption.
Assumption 1 The polynomials h1, h2, h3 ∈ Z[x, y, z] that are derived from the
reduced basis of the lattice in Coppersmith’s method are algebraically indepen-
dent.
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2.2 Continued fractions
Let ξ 6= 0 be real number. The continued fraction expansion of ξ is an expression
of the form
ξ = a0 +
1
a1 +
1
a2 +
1
. . .
,
where a0 is an integer and for i ≥ 1, ai is a positive integer. The integers ai,
i ≥ 0 are the partial quotients of the continued fraction expansion. The process
to compute the integers ai for i ≥ 0 is the continued fraction algorithm. The
starting term is x0 = ξ and for i ≥ 0,
ai = bxic, xi+1 = 1
xi − ai .
When the continued fraction expansion is used with the first k + 1 partial quo-
tients, the fraction is a convergent. The following method is very useful for
computing the convergents of ξ.
Theorem 3. The kth convergent can be determined as [a0, . . . , ak] =
pk
qk
, where
the sequences {pn} and {qn} are specified as follows3:
p−2 = 0, p−1 = 1, pn = anpn−1 + pn−2, ∀n ≥ 0,
q−2 = 1, q−1 = 0, qn = anqn−1 + qn−2, ∀n ≥ 0.
There are many properties related to the theory of continued fractions. One of
the most important results is Legendre’s Theorem (see Theorem 184 of [9]).
Theorem 4. Let ξ 6= 0 be a real number and a, b be two positive integers such
that ab 6∈ N and (a, b) = 1. If
0 <
∣∣∣ξ − a
b
∣∣∣ < 1
2b2
then ab is a convergent of the continued fraction of ξ.
Note that computing a convergent ab of ξ with the continued fraction algorithm
is done in polynomial time in log(b).
2.3 Elliptic curves
Let p ≥ 5 be a prime number and a and b two integers satisfying 4a3 + 27b2 6≡ 0
(mod p). An elliptic curve Ep(a, b) over Fp = Z/pZ is the set of solutions (x, y) ∈
F2p satisfying the equation
Ep(a, b) : y
2 ≡ x3 + ax+ b (mod p), (1)
3 The convergents start with p0
q0
, but it is a convention to extend the sequence index
to −1 and −2 to allow the recursive formula to hold for n = 0 and n = 1
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together with a point O, called the point at infinity. If P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 =
(x2, y2) are two points, then one have the following properties.
– P1 +O = O + P1 = P1.
– The opposite of P1 is −P1 = (x1,−y1).
– If P2 = −P1, then P1 + P2 = O.
– If P2 6= −P1, then P1 + P2 = P3 = (x3, y3) where
x3 ≡ λ2 − x1 − x2 (mod p), y3 ≡ λ(x1 − x3)− y1 (mod p),
with
λ =

y2 − y1
x2 − x1 if x1 6= x2,
3x21 + a
2y1
if x1 = x2.
With the former addition law, the set Ep(a, b) is a group of finite order #Ep(a, b)
where #Ep(a, b) is the number of solutions (x, y) ∈ F2p of the equation (1)
together with the point at infinity. According to a famous Theorem of Hasse
(see [23], Chapter 5), we have #Ep(a, b) = p+ 1− tp, with |tp| < 2√p, which is
close to p+ 1, up to a small value tp.
For specific values of p, #Ep(a, b) can be explicitly computed as for p ≡ 2
(mod 3) (see [22]).
Theorem 5. Let Ep(0, b) be an elliptic curve over Fp with equation y2 ≡ x3 + b
(mod p). If p ≡ 2 (mod 3), then number of points on Ep(0, b) is #Ep(0, b) =
p+ 1.
Since #Ep(a, b) is the order of the group Ep(0, b) for the addition law, then
#Ep(a, b) ·P = O for any point P ∈ Ep(a, b). When p ≡ 2 (mod 3), then for any
point P ∈, we have (p + 1)P = O. When N is a composite square free integer
and a and b are integers satisfying 4a3 + 27b2 6≡ 0 (mod p), one can define an
elliptic curve EN (a, b) over the ring Z/NZ by the equation
EN (a, b) : y
2 ≡ x3 + ax+ b (mod N), (2)
together with a point O at infinity. An addition law can be defined over EN (a, b)
by using the same rules as the addition law on Ep(a, b) by replacing modulo p by
modulo N . When the division by x2−x1 is not possible, this means that gcd(x2−
x1, n) 6= 1. Since 0 < |x2−x1| < n, then gcd(x2−x1, n) = p or gcd(x2−x1, n) = q.
If N = pq is an RSA modulus, this is equivalent to factoring N . Since the integer
factorization problem is very hard, especially for RSA moduli, then the scenario
that the addition does not exist is unlikely to happen. By the Chinese remainder
theorem, every point P = (x, y) ∈ EN (a, b) is uniquely represented by a pair of
points (Pp, Pq) ∈ Ep(a, b) × Eq(a, b) with the convention that O is represented
by the pair of points at infinity (Op,Oq) ∈ Ep(a, b)×Eq(a, b). It follows that for
p ≡ q ≡ 2 (mod 3) and for any point P ∈ EN (0, b), we have
(p+ 1)(q + 1)P = (p+ 1)(q + 1)(Pp, Pq) = (Op,Oq) = O.
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2.4 The KMOV Cryptosystem
In 1991, Koyama, Maurer, Okamoto and Vanstone proposed a cryptosystem,
called KMOV, based on the elliptic curve EN (0, b) where N = pq is an RSA
modulus. The scheme works as follows.
– KMOV Key Generation algorithm.
1. Choose two distinct prime numbers p and q of similar bit-length with
p ≡ q ≡ 2 (mod 3).
2. Compute N = pq.
3. Choose e such that gcd(e, (p+ 1)(q + 1)) = 1.
4. Compute d = e−1 (mod (p+ 1)(q + 1)).
5. Keep p, q, d secret, publish N, e.
– KMOV Encryption algorithm.
1. For a message m = (mx,my) ∈ Z2N , compute b = m2y −m3x (mod N).
2. Compute the point (cx, cy) = e(mx,my) on the elliptic curve with equa-
tion y2 ≡ x3 + b (mod N). The ciphertext is c = (cx, cy).
– KMOV Decryption algorithm.
1. For a ciphertext c = (cx, cy) ∈ Z2N , compute b = c2y − c3x (mod N).
2. Compute the point (mx,my) = d(cx, cy) on the elliptic curve y
2 ≡ x3+b
(mod N). The plaintext is m = (mx,my).
The complexity of the encryption and decryption algorithms are based on the
size of the encryption key e and the size of decryption key d, respectively. In a
cryptosystem with a limited resource such as a credit card, it is desirable to have
a smaller value of d or e. Unfortunately, when d is too small, Pinch [20] showed
that one can factor the RSA modulus N = pq if d < 13N
1
4 . Using a generalized
attack, Nitaj [18] showed that one can factor N when d ≡ yx (mod (p+1)(q+1))
is much larger under some extra conditions on x and y.
3 A New Improved Attack Based on Continued Fractions
In this section, we give an improved attack on KMOV based totally on the
continued fraction algorithm.
3.1 The new attack based on continued fractions
The attacks presented in [20] and [11] take advantage on using the convergents of
the continued fraction expansion of eN . Instead of using the convergents of
e
N , we
will use the convergents of eφ0 where φ0 is given by φ0 = N + 1 +
(
1 + 3
√
2
4
)
N
1
2 .
To this end, we will need the following result.
Lemma 1. For any N > 106, we have(
3√
2
− 2
)
N
1
2 + 2
(N + 2N
1
2 )2
<
1
8N
3
2
.
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Proof. Suppose that (
3√
2
− 2
)
N
1
2 + 2(
N + 2N
1
2
)2 < 18N 32 .
Then, clearing the denominators, we get
8N
1
2
((
3√
2
− 2
)
N
1
2 + 2
)
<
(
N
1
2 + 2
)2
,
which is equivalent to(
12
√
2− 16
)
N + 16N
1
2 < N + 4N
1
2 + 4.
This is true if (
12
√
2− 16
)
N + 16N
1
2 < N + 4N
1
2 ,
or equivalently 12 <
(
17− 12√2)N 12 . This is valid if
N > 106 >
(
12
17− 12√2
)2
.
This terminates the proof. uunionsq
The following lemma is useful for approximating the sizes of the prime factors
of an RSA modulus N = pq when p and q are of the same bit-size.
Lemma 2. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Then
2N
1
2 < p+ q <
3
√
2
2
N
1
2 .
Proof. Assume that q < p < 2q. Then 1 <
√
p
q <
√
2, so, since the function
f(x) = x+ 1x is increasing on [1,+∞), we get
2 <
√
p
q
+
√
q
p
<
√
2 +
1√
2
=
3
√
2
2
.
If we multiply by N
1
2 , we get
2N
1
2 < p+ q <
3
√
2
2
N
1
2 .
This terminates the proof. uunionsq
Now, we present our first improved attack on KMOV based on the continued
fraction algorithm. The following result shows that the secret information p, q, d
in a KMOV cryptosystem can be recovered from public information (e,N).
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Theorem 6. Let (N, e) be a public key in a KMOV cryptosystem with N =
pq > 106, q < p < 2q and gcd(e, (p+ 1)(q + 1)). If ed ≡ 1 (mod (p+ 1)(q + 1))
and d < 2
√
2N
3
4√
e
, then one can factor N in polynomial time in log(N).
Proof. Suppose that N = pq with q < p < 2q. Then, by Lemma 2, we get
N + 1 + 2N
1
2 < (p+ 1)(q + 1) < N + 1 +
3
√
2
2
N
1
2 .
We set φ1 = N+1+2N
1
2 and φ2 = N+1+
3
√
2
2 N
1
2 . Then (p+1)(q+1) ∈]φ1, φ2[.
Let
φ0 = N + 1 +
(
1 +
3
√
2
4
)
N
1
2 ,
be the midpoint of the interval [φ1, φ2]. Since (p+ 1)(q + 1) ∈ (φ1, φ2), then
|(p+ 1)(q + 1)− φ0| ≤ 1
2
(φ2 − φ1). (3)
If ed ≡ 1 (mod (p+ 1)(q + 1)), then ed− k(p+ 1)(q + 1) = 1, and∣∣∣∣ eφ0 − kd
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣( eφ0 − e(p+ 1)(q + 1)
)
+
(
e
(p+ 1)(q + 1)
− k
d
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣e((p+ 1)(q + 1)− φ0)φ0(p+ 1)(q + 1) + 1d(p+ 1)(q + 1)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣e((p+ 1)(q + 1)− φ0)φ0(p+ 1)(q + 1) + e(p+ 1)(q + 1)(k(p+ 1)(q + 1) + 1)
∣∣∣∣ .
Since φ0(p+ 1)(q + 1) > φ
2
1 and (p+ 1)(q + 1)(k(p+ 1)(q + 1) + 1) > φ
2
1, then∣∣∣∣ eφ0 − kd
∣∣∣∣ < e 12 (φ2 − φ1)φ21 + e 1φ21
= e
φ2 − φ1 + 2
2φ21
.
Then, combining (3) and φ1 = N + 1 + 2
√
N ≥ N + 2√N , we get
∣∣∣∣ eφ0 − kd
∣∣∣∣ < e
(
3
√
2
2 − 2
)√
N + 2
2
(
N + 2
√
N
)2 .
Using Lemma 1, for N > 106, we get∣∣∣∣ eφ0 − kd
∣∣∣∣ < e16N 32 .
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Now, suppose that e
16N
3
2
< 12d2 , that is d <
2
√
2N
3
4√
e
, then∣∣∣∣ eφ0 − kd
∣∣∣∣ < 12d2 .
It follows by Theorem 4 that kd is a convergent of
e
φ0
from which we deduce k and
d. Using the equation ed− k(p+ 1)(q+ 1) = 1, we get p+ q = ed−1k −N − 1 and
combining with N = pq, we easily find p and q. This gives to the factorization of
N = pq. Notice that, since the continued fraction algorithm works in polynomial
time, then finding p and q is done in polynomial time. uunionsq
3.2 Comparison with former attacks
In [20], Pinch extended Wiener’s attack [25] on RSA to KMOV and showed that
one can factor the modulus N = pq if the private exponent d satisfies d < 13N
1
4 .
In [11], Ibrahimpasic slightly extended the attack of Pinch by an extra exhaustive
research. In both attacks, the bounds do not depend on the size of e. In our new
attack, the bound is d < 2
√
2N
3
4√
e
and depends on e. In the typical situation
where e ≈ N , our bound becomes d < 2√2N 14 ≈ 2.828N 14 while the bound
in [20] is d < 13N
1
4 ≈ 0.333N 14 . Observe that our new bound d < 2√2N
3
4√
e
is
more significative for moderately small e.
Let us consider a numerical example. Consider the 1024 bit modulus N
N =128072253291560984675731339942623874155571330351805615681477940
737860111553200263411409851831323456088583497355190072283898949
746366445389418926799490964902211240447125449181697155706714427
483626444781096408044876129844375261551528718257946239064984462
426873862229453485949998050716038824410982005466246527621,
and the 999 bit public exponent.
e =296526935093015710407136686034981189608183689687233930438373260
994003008667647176609955506859286957594312864516062333691708865
839614673732252521930067346220763331390433471403382719324360755
735108333314843772805919919463508848644534123617058298952149225
5372881221811248133999406005069737107180854644647.
Then, applying the continued fraction algorithm to eφ0 and computing the con-
vergents, the 130th convergent is kd where
k =439246113481593542214907254431461323475931905724710548163257922
73119943084,
d =189713759006418854581978701838234268226797542876185500122247305
6385648715923809927.
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Using this convergent, we get p + q = ed−1k . Then combining with pq = N , we
get
p =122295652435077729919345520517086986879675097236430221980450907
006278884550539602496027848592931847870084590996181730049111792
44406300082071971851405178417,
q =104723471964426405086080002568566304601367956338101575543737215
792893331651240463496547152238295322902114471979717345643807495
25832667841702102917782974613.
We notice that kd is not among the convergents of
e
N which implies that the
methods of Pinch and Ibrahimpasic will not succeed.
4 A New Improved Attack Based on Coppersmith’s
Method
In this section, we present a new attack on KMOV based on Coppersmith’s
method.
4.1 The new attack
Theorem 7. Let (N, e) be a public key for the KMOV cryptosystem where N =
pq is an RSA modulus and e = Nβ. Suppose that e satisfies the equation eu −
(p+ 1)(q + 1)v = w with u < N δ and |w| < Nγ . If
δ <
7
6
− γ − 1
3
√
6β − 6γ + 1− ε,
for a small positive constant ε, then one can factor N in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that N = pq is an RSA modulus and e is a public exponent
satisfying eu− (p+ 1)(q + 1)v = w. Since (p+ 1)(q + 1) = N + p+ q + 1, then
v(N+p+q+1)+w ≡ 0 (mod e), which can be rewritten as v(p+q+1)+Nv+w ≡
0 (mod e). Consider the polynomial f(x, y, z) = xy + Nx + z, Then (x, y, z) =
(v, p+ q + 1, w) is a solution of the modular polynomial equation f(x, y, z) ≡ 0
(mod e). To find the solution (v, p+q+1, w), we apply Coppersmith’s method [8].
Let m and t be two positive integers to be optimized later. We use f(x, y, z) to
build the sets of polynomials
Gk,i1,i2,i3(x, y, z) = x
i1−kzi3f(x, y, z)kem−k,
for k = 0, . . .m, i1 = k, . . . ,m, i2 = k, i3 = m− i1,
Hk,i1,i2,i3(x, y, z) = y
i2−kzi3f(x, y, z)kem−k,
for k = 0, . . .m, i1 = k, i2 = k + 1, . . . , i1 + t, i3 = m− i1.
Let L denote the lattice spanned by the coefficient vectors of the polynomials
Gk,i1,i2,i3(Xx, Y y, Zz) and Hk,i1,i2,i3(Xx, Y y, Zz). By choosing the increasing
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ordering following the i1’s, then the i2’s, and the i3’s, one find a left triangular
matrix. For m = 2 and t = 1, the coefficient matrix for L is presented in Table 1
where the monomials are
{z3, xz2, x2z, x3, xyz2, x2yz, x3y, x2y2z, x3y2, x3y3, xy2z2, x2y3z, x2yz, x3y4}.
The non-zero elements are marked with an ‘~’ and do not influence the value of
the determinant.
z3 xz2 x2z x3 xyz2 x2yz x3y x2y2z x3y2 x3y3
Gk,i1,i2,i3
G0,0,0,3 Z
3e3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
G0,1,0,2 0 XZ
2e3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
G0,2,0,1 0 0 X
2Ze3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
G0,3,0,0 0 0 0 X
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
G1,1,1,2 ~ 0 0 0 XYZ2e2 0 0 0 0 0
G1,2,1,1 0 ~ ~ 0 0 X2Y Ze2 0 0 0 0
G1,3,1,0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0 X3Y e2 0 0 0
G2,2,2,1 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 X2Y 2Ze 0 0
G2,3,2,0 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 X3Y 2e 0
G3,3,3,0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ X3Y 3
Hk,i1,i2,i3
H0,0,1,3 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 ~
H1,1,2,2 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 0
H2,2,3,1 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0
H3,3,4,0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ 0
xy2z2 x2y3z x2yz x3y4
Gk,i1,i2,i3
G0,0,0,3 0 0 0 0
G0,1,0,2 0 0 0 0
G0,2,0,1 0 0 0 0
G0,3,0,0 0 0 0 0
G1,1,1,2 0 0 0 0
G1,2,1,1 0 0 0 0
G1,3,1,0 0 0 0 0
G2,2,2,1 0 0 0 0
G2,3,2,0 0 0 0 0
G3,3,3,0 0 0 0 0
Hk,i1,i2,i3
H0,0,1,3 XY
2Z2e2 0 0 0
H1,1,2,2 ~ X2Y 3Ze 0 0
H2,2,3,1 0 0 X
2Y Ze 0
H3,3,4,0 0 0 0 X
3Y 4
Table 1. The coefficient matrix for the case m = 2, t = 1.
The determinant of the triangular matrix is then the determinant of the
lattice L and can be easily computed as
det(L) = eneXnXY nY ZnZ . (4)
To find the values of the exponents ne, nX , nY , nZ , define the sum S(a) by
S(a) =
m∑
k=0
m∑
i1=k
k∑
i2=k
m−i1∑
i3=m−i1
a+
m∑
k=0
k∑
i1=k
i1+t∑
i2=k+1
m−i1∑
i3=m−i1
a.
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By the construction of the polynomials G and H, we get
ne = S(m− k) = 1
6
m(m+ 1)(2m+ 3t+ 4),
nX = S(i1) =
1
6
m(m+ 1)(2m+ 3t+ 4),
nY = S(i2) =
1
6
(m+ 1)
(
m2 + 3mt+ 3t2 + 2m+ 3t
)
,
nZ = S(i3) =
1
6
m(m+ 1)(m+ 3t+ 2).
(5)
The dimension of the lattice is the number of rows in the matrix. It can be
estimated as
ω = S(1) =
1
2
(m+ 1)(m+ 2t+ 2). (6)
If we set t = τm for some positive τ , then the dominant terms of the exponents
in (5) and 6 are
ne ≈ 1
6
(3τ + 2)m3 + o(m3),
nX ≈ 1
6
(3τ + 2)m3 + o(m3),
nY ≈ 1
6
(
3τ2 + 3τ + 1
)
m3 + o(m3),
nZ ≈ 1
6
(3τ + 1)m3 + o(m3),
w ≈ 1
6
(6τ + 3)m2 + o(m2).
(7)
Next, we apply the LLL algorithm 2 to the lattice L. We then get a reduced
basis where the three first vectors hi, i = 1, 2, 3 satisfy
‖h1‖ ≤ ‖h2‖ ≤ ‖h3‖ ≤ 2
ω(ω−1)
4(ω−2) det(L) 1ω−2 .
To apply Howgrave-Graham’s Theorem 1 to h1, h2 and h3, we set
2
ω(ω−1)
4(ω−2) det(L) 1ω−2 < e
m
√
ω
,
from which we deduce
det(L) < 2−ω(ω−1)4 1
(
√
ω)
ω−2 e
m(ω−2).
Using (4), we get
eneXnXY nY ZnZ < 2−
ω(ω−1)
4
1
(
√
ω)
ω−2 e
m(ω−2). (8)
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Suppose that e = Nβ , u < N δ and |w| < Nγ . Then, using Lemma 2, we
have p + q + 1 ≤ 2p < 2√2√N. Since p + q + 1 is represented by y, we set
Y =
⌊
2
√
2
√
N
⌋
. On the other hand, since (p+ 1)(q + 1) > N and |w| < eu, we
get
|v| = |eu− w|
(p+ 1)(q + 1)
<
eu+ |w|
(p+ 1)(q + 1)
<
2eu
N
< 2Nβ+δ−1. (9)
Since v is represented by x, we set X =
⌊
2Nβ+δ−1
⌋
. Also, since w is represented
by Z, we set Z = bNγc . It follows that the solution (x, y, z) = (v, p+ q + 1, w)
satisfies |x| < X, |y| < Y and |z| < Z and (8) is satisfied if
2nX
(
2
√
2
)nY
Nneβ+nX(β+δ−1)+
nY
2 +nZγ < 2−
ω(ω−1)
4
1
(
√
ω)
ω−2N
m(ω−2)β . (10)
Using the approximations of ne, nX , nY , nZ given in (7) and ω given 6, the
inequality 8 leads to
N
(
(3τ+2)β+(3τ+2)(β+δ−1)+ 3τ2+3τ+12 +(3τ+1)γ
)
m3
< 2−nX
(
2
√
2
)−nY
2−
ω(ω−1)
4
1
(
√
ω)
ω−2N
−2βmN (6τ+3)βm
3
.
(11)
To homogenize the exponentiation of N , we set
2−nX
(
2
√
2
)−nY
2−
ω(ω−1)
4
1
(
√
ω)
ω−2N
−2βm = N−µm
3
,
where µ is a small positive constant. Then, taking logarithms and dividing by
m3 logN , we get
(3τ + 2)β + (3τ + 2)(β + δ − 1) + 3τ
2 + 3τ + 1
2
+ (3τ + 1)γ − (6τ + 3)β < −µ.
The optimal value for the left hand side is τ0 =
1−2δ−2γ
2 , which, plugged in the
former inequality leads to
−12δ2 − 24δγ − 12γ2 + 8β + 28δ + 20γ − 15 < −8µ,
and consequently
δ <
7
6
− γ − 1
3
√
6β − 6γ + 1− ε,
where ε is a small positive constant that depends on m and N . Within this
condition, the reduced lattice has three polynomials h1(x, y, z), h2(x, y, z) and
h2(x, y, z) sharing the root (x0, y0, z0) = (v, p+q+1, w). Then, applying Gro¨bner
basis or resultant computations, we get the expected solution (x0, y0, z0) from
which we deduce p + q = y − 1. Together with the equation pq = N , this leads
to finding p and q. This terminates the proof. uunionsq
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4.2 Comparison with former attacks
In [18], Nitaj presented an algorithm for factoring the modulus N = pq when
the public exponent e satisfies an equation of the form eu− (p+ 1)(q+ 1)v = w,
where the unknown parameters u, v and w are such that
|w| < (p− q)N
1
4 v
3(p+ q)
, uv <
√
2
√
N
12
. (12)
The idea in [18] is to compute the convergents of the continued fraction of eN ,
and for each convergent vu with uv <
√
2
√
N
12 , to compute U and V with
U =
eu
v
−N − 1, V =
√
|U2 − 4N |.
Then p˜ = 12 (U + V ) is a possible approximation of the prime factor p with error
term of at most 2N
1
4 . If so, then by applying Coppersmith’s method, one can
find p, and then factor N .
To compare our new results and the result of [18], suppose that e = Nβ ,
u < N δ and |w| < Nγ . Then, by (9), we get |v| < 2Nβ+δ−1. Hence, the inequal-
ities (12) are fulfilled if
Nγ <
2(p− q)N 14Nβ+δ−1
3(p+ q)
, 2NδNβ+δ−1 <
√
2
√
N
12
.
Then, neglecting the constants and assuming that p− q ≈ p+ q, the former two
inequalities are true if
γ <
1
4
+ β + δ − 1, 2δ + β − 1 < 1
2
.
This leads to δ < 34 − 12β, which is to be compared with the new bound
δ <
7
6
− γ − 1
3
√
6β − 6γ + 1− ε.
Define
δ0 =
3
4
− 1
2
β, δ1 =
7
6
− γ − 1
3
√
6β − 6γ + 1.
A typical situation is when e ≈ N , that is β = 1, and |w| is small, that is γ = 0.
Then the bounds δ0 and δ1 are δ0 = 0.25, δ1 ≈ 0.284. We see that the new
method overcome the method of [18] in the most realistic situations of instances
of KMOV.
5 Conclusion
We have presented two new attacks on the KMOV cryptosystem which is an
RSA type cryptosystem based on elliptic curves. The first attack is based on the
continued fraction algorithm and the second is based on Coppersmith’s method.
Both attacks work when the private key is suitably small and the new results
improve the former attacks on the KMOV elliptic curve cryptosystem.
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